Visual Reconnaissance missions relied upon crews to observe and report on the air and ground situation in the assigned areas. These missions reported on everything from enemy air activity to troop concentrations. Reconnaissance missions were well adapted to gathering intelligence in a rapidly changing advance, such as General Mitchel’s (then a Colonel) famous flight in which he discovered an all-out German advance the Marne River near Chateau Thierry. Gen Mitchell’s reconnaissance flight gave Allied Commanders just enough time to reposition and thwart the attack.[i]

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The improved range of artillery batteries allowed them to fire at targets they could not see. Their range necessitated placing ground observers so far ahead of the lines as to be impractical. The airplane assumed this new role as a forward observer. Airplanes, using their height advantage could spot targets and direct artillery fire deep into enemy territory. Their primary means of communication to friendly batteries was through the use of an onboard wireless telegraph transmitter. The transmitter was powered by a wind driven generator. As its name suggests, the transmitter could only transmit in Morse code but could not receive messages.

Artillery batteries communicated with aircraft using panels placed on the ground arranged in various shapes to transmit a coded message. See figure 1.

Though complex and prone to failure, this method was used to great affect during the advance on the city of Vaux by Pilots Johnny Miller and Maj Brereton with Observer Lt. Elmer Haslett.[ii]

Photo Reconnaissance

Photo missions were critical to evaluating enemy defenses and plans. Photos preserved accurate locations of trenches, troop concentrations and equipment. They provided information from which maps could be developed, obstacles measured and when compared to previous photos, enemy intentions. The 12th primarily flew tactical photo missions over enemy and friendly lines near the Front. Other squadrons typically performed the long-range strategic missions deep behind enemy lines.

Crews used either “hand-held” cameras hung on the outside of the fuselage or more commonly, a floor mounted camera that came in a manual and automatic plate switching versions. A typical photo mission used between 12 and 36 exposure plates to cover an assigned area.

Infantry Contact

These missions were by far considered the most dangerous type flown by observation squadrons. During ground attacks the infantry depended on artillery barrages to suppress enemy defenses while they advanced. These were called “rolling barrages.”

Advances rarely proceeded as planned and troops could find themselves unprotected too far behind the artillery barrage or worse yet too far forward and being shelled by friendly artillery. Communication in a wartime environment was challenging to say the least. Portable radios were not yet reliable nor readily available. Communication lines were often severed by enemy fire and sending a runner or troop with a message on foot, was slow and also unreliable.

To solve this problem, the A.E.F. employed aircraft to locate friendly and enemy lines and report their location to Headquarters so they could track the progress of the battle.

In theory, an observation plane was to fly over the expected location of the lines and shoot a pre-arranged flare pattern signaling troops to reveal their locations using ground panels. The observer then recorded their location and dropped the message in a can with a streamer over H.Q.

There were several problems with this relatively simple concept.

Troops were often not trained to recognize friendly aircraft or how to communicate with them via panels. If they were trained, several were simply too busy dealing with realities on the ground and found placing panels too impractical to use. Others refused to display panels for fear enemy aircraft would spot their location and bring the artillery down on them. In reality, troops rarely revealed their positions to friendly aircraft.

Aircrews, still had a mission to perform. If the infantry would not reveal their positions, then the aircrews would simply have to fly low enough to find them. This often drove crews to fly between near tree-top height and 1,000’ allowing them to differentiate between enemy and friendly troops by identifying the color and markings on their uniforms. Flying at such a low altitude exposed crews to the intense artillery barrages, ground fire and attack from the air.

I took a crew with very solid nerves to perform these critical missions.

Escort

Observation squadrons often performed missions without direct support of the fighter squadrons. The Air Service was small and there just weren’t enough to go around. To make up for this shortage and better ensure success of their missions, the 12th often used its own crews to provide protection.

Propaganda

At times the 12th was assigned to drop Allied propaganda over German lines. These missions were especially hated by the enemy. An enemy aircraft could spot the mile long trail of papers fluttering to the ground leading them right to the crew responsible.

Arthur & Fleeson discovered just how dangerous this mission could be when they were attacked by six enemy Fokkers and eventually forced down in friendly territory.[iii]

Miller, R. G. (2000). A "pretty damn able commander": Lewis Hyde Brereton(4th ed., Vol. 47). Air Power History.

[i] Haslett, E. (2013). Luck on the wing: Recollections of an american aerial observer during the first world war. Place of publication not identified: Leonaur.

[ii] Miller, R. G. (2000). A "Pretty Damn Able Commander": Lewis Hyde Brereton(4th ed., Vol. 47). Air Power History.

[iii] Richardson, J. M. (1931, April). Popular Aviation. At the Mercy of the Enemy, pp. 3-12, 64.